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T
he provision of wholesome, affordable and safe drinking water that has the trust of
customers is the goal of the international water utility sector. Risk management, in
terms of protecting the public health from pathogenic and chemical hazards has
driven and continues to drive developments within the sector. In common with much of
industry, the water sector is formalizing and making explicit approaches to risk management
and decision-making that have formerly been implicit. Here, we review the risk management
frameworks and risk analysis tools and techniques used within the water sector, considering
their application at the strategic, programme and operational levels of decision-making. Our
analysis extends the application beyond that of public health to issues of financial risk
management, reliability and risk-based maintenance and the application of business risk
maturity models.
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INTRODUCTION
Providing wholesome, affordable and safe drinking water
that has the trust of customers is the overarching goal of
the water utility sector. The sector has publicly stated
(AWWA et al., 2001) that achieving this requires, at a
minimum, that water is safe in microbiological and chemical
terms, that it is acceptable to consumers in terms of taste,
odour and appearance, and that the supply is reliable in
terms of quality and quantity.
Delivering safety, acceptability and reliability within a
multi-stakeholder, institutional and business context in
which expectations are rising is challenging. Privatization,
sector globalization, increased competition, emerging
technologies, increasingly stringent regulatory control and
the trend towards financial self-sufficiency are all serving
to transform the water sector, and posing new risks and
opportunities (Westerhoff, 2003; Huber, 2000; Westerhoff
and Lane, 1996; Kucera, 1993). Many within the industry
are now promoting an enterprise-wide approach to
risk management as a means to ease and indeed exploit
this transition (e.g. Lifton and Smeaton, 2003). This
requires:
(1) integrated frameworks for the management of internal
(e.g. from ageing infrastructure) and external (e.g.
from market processes or competitor actions) risks to
the utility;
(2) the support of board-level, executive management
and operational staff as well as that of external stake-
holders; and
(3) the effective communication of risk and engagement
within decision-making processes both within compa-
nies and with external stakeholders.
Developing organizational cultures responsive and not
necessarily wholly averse to risk is itself a challenge.
Recent international reports (Stern and Fineberg, 1996;
Economic and Social Research Council Global Environ-
mental Change Programme, 2000; Prime Minister’s Stra-
tegy Unit, 2002; Royal Academy of Engineering, 2003;
Australian Academy of Technological Sciences and
Engineering, 2002) have commented on the relationship
between risk management and organizational performance
and culture. Critical aspects include:
. the importance of openness, transparency, engagement,
proportionality, precaution, evidence and responsibility
to good decision-making;
. the critical role of taking a long-term perspective in
assessing the potential indirect consequences of manage-
ment actions; and
. a widely-held view that ‘hard’ quantitative risk analysis
tools used in isolation of transparent decision-making
does little to gain public confidence and can result in
the long-term erosion of trust.Te
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Although the techniques of risk identification, analysis
and management have been commonly applied within
other process industries, their explicit and routine use
within the water utility sector has historically been less
widespread (Egerton, 1996). There is considerable scope
for learning from the experiences of related utility sectors,
for example the offshore (UK Offshore Oil Operators
Association, 1999), energy supply and nuclear industries
(European Commission, 2000), and from companies at
the cutting edge of risk management. These combined
experiences will prove invaluable to the water sector as it
considers the risk analysis strategies and decision-making
frameworks it might adopt for more defensible and
rewarding utility decisions.
The transition to an explicit risk management philo-
sophy within the water utility sector is reflected in recent
revisions to the World Health Organization’s (WHO)
Guidelines for Drinking Water Quality (Fewtrell and
Bartram, 2001; WHO, 2002, 2003). This is placing an
emphasis on the development and implementation of
water safety plans for water quality management and,
within these, application of risk frameworks such as
the ‘hazard analysis and critical control points’ (HACCP)
approach (Dewettinck et al., 2001; Hellier, 2000) as a basis
for prioritizing risk management measures within the
water supply chain from catchment to tap. The approaches
place primary emphasis on achieving effective operational
performance than a narrow focus of monitoring finished
water quality (end-product testing) against numerical
water quality standards. The latter approach is funda-
mentally reactive rather than preventative and is inherently
less reliable given the limitations of monitoring in
proportion and frequency.
RISK GOVERNANCE
Commentators increasingly refer to activity that inte-
grates risk management across legal, financial, environ-
mental and other risks as ‘risk governance’ (European
Commission, 2000): ‘governance’, because the frameworks
proposed extend to the broader institutional arrangements
and responsibilities for managing risk (e.g. National
Health and Medical Research Council, 2001; Council of
Standards of Australia, 1999). Clarity over the account-
abilities, both between and within organizations, is essential
if risk management is to translate into practical procedures
that deliver sustainable improvements in service and
decision-making to the drinking water community. A criti-
cal aspect is the capabilities of institutions in managing
risk. These can be thought of as the processes, people,
reports, methodologies and technologies (collectively,
‘risk infrastructure’) acquired or developed to systemati-
cally identify, source, measure, manage and monitor risks
(DeLoach, 2000). Although mostly qualitative, attempts
have been made to categorize and rank institutional risk
management expertise. For example, Sharp et al. (2002)
describe a ‘maturity’ model in which organizations
progress from being ‘learner organizations’ with ad hoc
approaches to risk and reliability management through to
‘adaptive organizations’, which have an adaptive, respon-
sive and proactive approach.
The structural hierarchy that exists even within ‘flat’
organizations requires that risks are actively managed at the
strategic, programme and operational levels of an organi-
zation (Figure 1). Typically, there are split accountabilities
for these risks such that the chief financial officer/financial
director and board have overall responsibility, supported
by an internal audit or control function for the management
of strategic risks; executive management for programme
level risks (e.g. asset management, maintenance planning)
and operational (e.g. site) managers for operational
risks (e.g. plant performance). Many companies have risk
management committees in place that monitor and report
on priority risk areas within the company, principally
in response to requirements on internal control. Beyond
these company boundaries, there are important risk
interfaces with other institutions including the regulators
(e.g. licenses to operate) and the capital markets (e.g. rais-
ing finance).
An important interface concerns the financing of
infrastructure spend and the raising of capital. Over and
above the levy of rates at the local level to support
investment on the maintenance of water and wastewater
treatment systems, capital spend within public sector
utilities is supported through the tax base and granted via
a series of government-aided revenue streams or funds. For
example, in the US, the Clean Water State Revolving
Fund (set up under the 1987 Clean Water Act) provides
financial support to individual states to pay for sewage
treatment works, and the Drinking Water State Revolving
Fund (1996 Safe Drinking Water Act) supports capital
investments in water treatment facilities. Within private
sector utilities, capital (Figure 2) is typically raised
from the markets, e.g. as shares or a bank loan and inves-
ted in a firm’s operations (e.g. a treatment plant). These
investments are treated as costs and include all capital
and operational expenditure. Operation develops revenue,
and if this income exceeds expenditure it is returned
back to the investors or reinvested into the company. The
latter is acceptable if it leads to an increase or securing
of the current value of the share price (Strutt, 2003).
In the UK, the water regulators [the Office of Water
Services for England and Wales (Ofwat), the Drinking
Figure 1. The risk hierarchy (after Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit, 2002).
Figure 2. Water utilities and financial risk (after Strutt, 2003).
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Water Inspectorate (DWI) and the Environment Agency
(EA)] have raised the prominence of risk management
for assessing company performance. Following the 1999
periodic review of the industry, Ofwat released ‘Maintain-
ing serviceability to customers (MD161)’ to managing
directors of all water and sewerage companies and water-
only companies, underlining Ofwat’s desire to formalize
risk management within the asset planning process. The
procedures developed by the UK water sector are of
equal merit to public sector utilities abroad in that
each company needs to demonstrate how the flow of services
to customers can be maintained at least cost in terms of both
capital maintenance and operating expenditure, recognizing
the trade-off between cost and risk, whilst ensuring compliance
with statutory duties.
Ofwat’s position has since been further clarified under
the ‘common framework’ outlining the requirements for
the 2004 Periodic review, embedding risk management
firmly in the process. The DWI in their letter (IL15/
2002), ‘Distribution Operation and Maintenance Strategies
(DOMS), DWI requirements and expectations’ expands
the need for water utilities to demonstrably and explicitly
manage the risks from their operational activities.
Utility managers manage cash flow, whether raised
through public or private sector means, by optimizing
expenditure and income in the context of providing good,
safe drinking water. Events inevitably occur that reduce
income and cause increased expenditure. For example,
failures in the infrastructure/distribution network causing
leaks lead to increased expenditure on leak detection and
pipe repair, refurbishment or asset replacement. Public
health incidents requiring emergency response and water
advisories often incur substantial costs. The techniques of
risk management are applied for at least one, and usually
several of the following categories of risk:
(1) Financial risk. These are risks arising principally
from the financial operations and management of the
business. From an internal perspective, both capital
and operating costs are reduced by carrying out assess-
ments during the design stage of a scheme, whilst
operating and maintenance costs can be optimised on
existing plant. External financial risks are derived
from market processes (e.g. currency rate fluctua-
tions) and are of rapidly increasing significance to
water utilities, given the increasing need for self-
financing and the twin trends of privatization and
globalization.
(2) Commercial risk. Formerly considered immune to such
risks owing to their public sector monopoly, utilities
are no longer insulated from competition or financial
instability. They face an increasingly demanding
public with powers to make significant changes if
unsatisfied (Westerhoff, 2003; Westerhoff and Lane,
1996). A serious accident can depress the share price
in publicly quoted companies, persuading boards to
make management changes.
(3) Public health risk. Failure or inadequacy of the
treatment and distribution process can result in an
interruption of supply or derogation in water quality
(microbiological or chemical). The underlying causes
may include source contamination, human error,
mechanical failure or network intrusion. The conse-
quences can be immediate; there is often very little
time to reduce exposure and the impacts can affect a
large number of people simultaneously. The financial
costs to the community of the fatal Walkerton out-
break, for example, were in excess of Cdn$65 million,
with one-time costs to Ontario estimated at more than
Cdn$100 million (O’Connor, 2002). The loss of con-
sumer confidence has been enormous (Hrudey and
Leiss, 2003).
(4) Environmental risk. Equipment failure or human
error can lead to environmental impacts, including
discharges to the atmosphere, ground or the water
environment. These may occur directly or as a result
of actions to mitigate the results of the failure, such
as discharges of polluted water from a tank. Similarly,
environmental change can affect water quality. The
relationship between watershed management, source
quality and water quality at the tap is inevitably one
characterized by a need for sound risk management.
(5) Reputation risk. For most water utilities and regulators,
the biggest fear is the loss of consumer confidence. If
an organization has target levels in its customer charter,
considerable time and effort can be taken up by custo-
mer service functions explaining to customers and the
media when incidents occur. The Sydney Water crisis
of 1998 (McClellan, 1998) was estimated to have
cost Sydney Water Corporation over $37 million in
directs costs with contingency costs estimated at over
$100 million, for an episode with no health conse-
quences (Quill, 1999).
(6) Compliance/legal risk. Legislation sets out minimum
standards for water quality, the handling and storage
of treatment chemicals, the discharge of wastes and
the health and safety of the operational staff and the
people living nearby. Aside from the inherent risk of
failure to comply with legislation (with all its associ-
ated consequences), there is the risk arising from uncer-
tainty regarding the future actions of the regulator/
legislator. Even when there is no legislation covering
some aspects, there can be claims of negligence against
operating companies and litigation for civil damages
have been prominent features following both the
Walkerton outbreak (settled out of court) and the
Sydney Water Crises (largely dismissed, costs still
incurred).
Assessing risk across these and other categories then
becomes essential for optimizing operations and cost/
benefit trade-offs. A typical issue is the optimization of
workforce planning (e.g. asset inspection or maintenance
scheduling). In risk-based resourcing, human (and finan-
cial) resources are targeted towards addressing higher risk
activities (Pollard et al., 2002; Figure 3). The presumption
is that moving to risk-based resourcing (focusing on poorly
performing assets, the failure consequences from which
are higher) yields greater risk reduction per unit resource
of maintenance. Many water companies have risk ranking
procedures in place to inform maintenance scheduling.
Principles have been developed for the proper design
(Long and Fischoff, 2000) of ranking systems following
earlier criticism over the implications of bias within these
systems.
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RISK MANAGEMENT
Decisions on managing risk, if they are to be effective,
need to be active rather than reactive and well structured
(Pollard and Guy, 2001). Risk management frame-
works set out the relationship between the processes of
risk identification, evaluation and management (Jardine
et al., 2003). They can be regarded as ‘route maps’
for decision makers. The principles for water utility risk
management have been outlined for the Australian water
industry to illustrate the value of developing a preventative
quality management approach (Hrudey, 2001). One of
these, ‘turning hindsight into foresight’, has been deve-
loped as a compilation and analysis of case studies of drink-
ing water outbreaks in developed countries (Hrudey and
Hrudey, 2004).
Classical linear approaches to risk management have
been replaced by iterative frameworks that adopt the man-
agement processes of ‘assess–plan–do–monitor–revise’
and that aim to engage stakeholders in decision-making.
Their application has resulted in a reappraisal of risk
analysis in which the relationship between the analysis of
risk and the audience is recognized as central to defensible
decisions. The US Presidential/Congressional Commission
on Risk Assessment and Risk Management (1997) was
among the first of government responses to take a fresh
look at the issue of risk management. The framework
(Figure 4) recognizes the continuous improvement neces-
sary for organizations to develop a mature capacity in
risk management and the central role of stakeholders to
the decision-making process. It emphasises the importance
of (a) good problem definition, (b) management feed-
back in making decisions, and (c) the central role of stake-
holders within the decision-making process. Here, risk
analysis is viewed not as an end in its own right, but as
a means of selecting and prioritizing options for risk
management, that themselves require evaluation after
implementation, all set within a context of making better
decisions. These frameworks can, however, inadvertently
cloud the explicit role of science and evidence within
decision-making. The ‘process’ and ‘content’ of decisions
must be viewed as equally important to the outcome, thus
developments since the US Presidential Commission are
focusing on making more explicit the role for scientific
evidence within democratic decision-making processes
(e.g. USEPA, 1999; Charnley, 2000).
TOOLS AND TECHNIQUES FOR RISK ANALYSIS
AT THE OPERATIONAL, PROGRAMME
AND STRATEGIC LEVEL
Risk analysis plays a role alongside other decision tools
for risk management. Not all risks require detailed analysis
to be managed. In many industries there are accepted
standards of performance and codes of practice (e.g. engin-
eering standards; accepted best practice; Figure 5) that, if
adhered to, provide high degrees of control. These are
applied where uncertainties and system vulnerabilities are
well understood. However, complex, uncertain and novel
systems, and situations with a deviation from routine
operation, may require risk analysis, so as to better under-
stand what drives the risk from or to the plant, process or
operation, thereby allowing management measures for the
reduction of unacceptable risks to be targeted.
Tools and techniques for the analysis of these different
types of risk vary by their sophistication and design. A
wide range of approaches are available (Table 1) from
distribution modelling for the analysis of contaminants
and pathogens within catchments, to probabilistic fault
tree models for the analysis of potential engineering fail-
ures at the works level. The implementation of a portfolio
of risk techniques within a water utility is contingent on
institutional capacity, data quality and the requirements
of the decision that the risk analysis is informing.
Operational Risk Analysis
Here we are concerned with the assessment of risks
associated with specific operations at plant level—for
example, the risk of failure of a device or process com-
ponent, or the risk of exceeding a particular water quality
standard. A common technique used is a semiquantitative
risk ranking of hazards according to their likelihood and
consequence. Leverett (2000) describes the ranking of
risks from and to routine and non-routine process opera-
tions within four risk categories: health and safety, water
quality, water quantity and environmental. Analysis and
prioritization assists treatment managers in identifying
Figure 3. Risk-based workforce planning (after Pollard et al., 2002).
Figure 4. Risk Management Framework (after US Presidential/Congres-
sional Commission on Risk Assessment and Risk Management, 1997).
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and mitigating previously unforeseen risks to operations,
and the planning of projects such as the shut-down and
maintenance of a strategic treated water reservoir. A similar
ranking approach has been used to identify health and
safety hazards at treatment works, e.g. with respect to
hazardous chemical usage (Wirth and Siebert, 2000). Typi-
cally, risk ranking is used to screen risks as part of a more
involved tiered risk assessment programme. The National
Health and Medical Research Council (NHMRC), the
body responsible for issuing drinking water guidelines to
Australian water utilities, in their ‘Framework for manage-
ment of drinking water quality’ (National Health and
Medical Research Council, 2001, Rizak et al., 2003)
describe the incorporation of several risk assessment
Figure 5. Decision framework for the offshore oil industry (after UK Offshore Oil Operators Association, 1999).
Table 1. Risk analysis strategies for operational, programme level and strategic risks in the water utility sector.
Level Example Tools used Reference
Operational Assessing reservoir safety—operations and
structural condition
Fault and event tree analysis Parr and Cullen (1988)
Health and safety hazard assessment—
chemical use at water and wastewater
treatment works
Risk ranking
Hazard and operability studies (HAZOP)
What if, checklists
Failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA)
Fault-tree analysis
Wirth and Siebert (2000)
Process risk assessment and project
contingency planning
Risk ranking Leverett (2003)
Individual pathogen risk assessment Simulation (e.g. Monte Carlo) Teunis et al, (1997)
Masago et al, (2002)
Programme Risk-based asset management GIS-based infrastructure risk models Doyle and Grabinsky (2003)
Booth and Rogers (2001)
Process risk assessment to help formulate
asset management strategy
Risk ranking Abell and Askey (2001)
Failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA)
Prioritising expenditure on mains
rehabilitation.
Three tiered risk assessment: Radovanovic and Marlin (2003)
(1) Risk ranking
(2) Generic quantitative risk assessment
model (KANEW)
(3) Monitoring programme with
tailored QRA
Strategic Investment risk analysis—Portfolio
management for public utilities
Multi-attribute analysis Rothstein and Kiyosaki (2003)
Scenario planning and analysis
Financial risks of public–private
partnerships for infrastructure projects
Simple expected cost analysis Grimsey and Lewis (2002)
Sensitivity analysis
Monte Carlo simulation
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techniques within a single quality management system. In
addition to risk ranking, the framework advocates the
application of a HACCP (hazard analysis critical control
points) methodology, namely the determination of ‘critical
control points’ whereupon risks can be monitored and
reduced. The NHMRC framework proposes that utilities
should adopt a multiple barrier approach to risk manage-
ment (Hrudey and Hrudey, 2003; Deere et al., 2001),
ensuring multiple levels of protection against specific
contaminant threats. NHMRC presents an example of this
from two treatment works, both with very different water
sources: (a) a heavily protected catchment (Melbourne)
and (b) a large river fed by multi-use catchments
(Adelaide). In the Melbourne system, applied barriers
include protected catchments, large catchment reservoirs,
and good chlorination, whereas in the Adelaide system
the barriers are more heavily weighted towards treatment
and downstream controls. Risk analysis has long been
the basis for the derivation of water quality guidelines
for drinking water (WHO, 2002). The substance-specific
health risk assessments that have historically informed
the guidelines may, however, be somewhat distanced
from the immediate operational context of individual
utilities. The recent draft of the third edition of the WHO
drinking water guidelines (WHO, 2003) provides explicit
reference to chemical and pathogenic risk management
for water quality control. Risk analysis tools are available
for informing utility decisions on risk management.
The New Zealand Ministry of Health (NZHOH) has
developed a pragmatic programme for encouraging public
health management plans (NZMOH, 2001). Their approach
was developed with full awareness of HACCP but a con-
scious decision was made to focus on ‘events’ defined
as incidents or situations that may lead to hazards being
introduced into, or not being removed from, the water
(Nokes and Taylor, 2003). In developing this approach,
four barriers were identified that, if maintained effective,
will adequately control hazards:
. prevention of contamination entering the raw water of
the supply;
. removal of particles from the water;
. inactivation of microorganisms in the water; and
. maintenance of the quality of the water during distri-
bution.
The NZMOH approach targets smaller systems and particu-
larly valuable for systems with limited technical resources.
Teunis et al. (1997) and Masago et al. (2002) describe
the application of quantitative microbial risk assessment
in an operational context, in determining the risk posed
by pathogens from specific source waters. The process
begins with the definition of the relationship between
pathogen source levels and the consumed dose, followed
by the construction of a deterministic model mathemati-
cally describing this relationship. The relevant dose–
response relationship is applied in order to determine the
‘unconditional’ probability of infection—unconditional
because at this stage no consideration has been given to
the distribution spread of the outcome. In order to deter-
mine this spread, the first step is to generate the range of
values for the input variables and specify their probability
distributions. The authors input these values into a Monte
Carlo simulation, which through a process of iterative
sampling provides a frequency distribution for the proba-
bility of infection. Similar approaches can be adopted for
determining the risk of exceeding water quality compliance
standards at a particular plant. In assessing the potential
threats to water supplies from ongoing or accidental releases
within catchments, Halfacree (1998) describes the use
of PRAIRIE, a PC-based software tool for assessing chemi-
cal pollution risks to water bodies. The main elements are
an aquatic dispersion model; hydrological, substance and
standards databases; and a tabular/graphical output facility.
The model has a deterministic mode (used to ‘screen out’
low risk sites) and a probabilistic mode (for more detailed
analysis of high risk sites). The output results (e.g. fre-
quency vs concentration curves) are compared with pre-
determined criteria to inform regulatory actions on risk
management from hazardous activities within a sensitive
catchment.
Risk analysis at the operational level is further concerned
with the reliability of the system components, for example
in determining the risk of failure of a particular treatment
step. The analysis may be summarized (Egerton, 1996):
. What can go wrong with the system?
. What are the effects and consequences of failure?
. How often will that failure occur?
For unreliable or heavily used equipment, an analysis of
the historical data is often sufficient for determining
frequencies of failure. In the absence of such data, there
exist a number of techniques for assessing the frequency
and consequences of system failure, including fault tree
analysis (e.g. Parr and Cullen, 1988) and failure mode
and effect analysis (e.g. Demotier et al., 2002).
Programme Level Risk Analysis
At the programme level, we are concerned primarily
with techniques used to evaluate the risks posed by a simi-
lar hazard at a variety of locations (e.g. mains bursts,
progressive failure of filter media—in asset management,
for example) or with the wide variety of risks existing
within a watershed. The availability of geographic
information systems has facilitated the ease by which
such assessments can be performed. Programme level risk
assessments are typically concerned with the implemen-
tation of strategies across multiple sites and geographic
regions (catchment/watershed planning).
Risk analysis of infrastructure assets is widespread
within the sector, and is a critical tool in asset management.
Approaches range from the simple coupling of GIS
techniques with infrastructure data in order to visually
track utility assets and examine their associated risk
factors (e.g. Doyle and Grabinsky, 2003; Booth and
Rogers, 2001) to the complex integration of data intensive
GIS with hydraulic simulations in order to assess the
risk of distribution system intrusion (e.g. Lindley and
Buchberger, 2002). On a national scale, the US Natural
Resources Defence Council (NRDC, 2003) recently
reported on the risk to drinking water quality from
aging pipes and process plant across the USA with
individual city ‘rankings’ being informed by water quality
data, USEPA compliance records and water utility annual
reports. Similar risk ranking techniques have been used
internationally to inform threat assessments of water sys-
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tems in light of recent terrorist activities (e.g. Anonymous,
2001).
The assessment of hazards to the quality of water
resources within a catchment or watershed is increasingly
subject to formal risk assessment and can be expected
as part of routine water safety plans (Umweltbudesamt,
2003; WHO, 2003; UKWIR, 2003). In Europe, the
DPSIR approach to identifying key hazards within a
watershed, by reference to the driving forces (e.g. popu-
lation growth), pressures (sewer discharge), state (increased
nutrient load), impacts (anthropogenic eutrophication)
and policy response (discharge control) is being adop-
ted under the European Water Framework Directive
(IMPRESS Management, 2002). Here, risk assessments
are intended to inform a programme of activities targeted
at raising the ecological status of the watershed. Various
tools are available for the analysis of catchment risks. For
example, Wickham and Wade (2002) have developed a
watershed risk model of nitrogen and phosphorus export
based on the surrounding land cover class, whilst Verro
et al. (2002) describe a GIS-based mass balance model
for use in risk assessments of agricultural chemicals.
Given the plethora of potential catchment management
issues in any improvement programme, there is a need to
prioritize risk management within the watershed by con-
centrating on those measures that reduce the significant
likelihood of severe impacts being realised. Lytton et al.
(2003) describe a generic methodology based on the
source—pathway—receptor model (Environment Agency,
2000) that enables the evaluation and ranking of potential
pollution risks to groundwater abstractions. This ranking
is designed to be used in prioritizing risk management or
mitigation procedures.
Programme level risk analysis invariably involves
trading costs and benefits, such as in risk-based resourcing
previously described (Figure 3). When designed well,
piloted and implemented with feedback, these systems
can provide a sound basis for distinguishing greater risks
from lesser ones, and for investing resources in risk
management that are proportional to the risks posed
(Pollard et al., 2002). However, these systems, whether
for driving maintenance schedules, monitoring regimes or
workforce planning, may also incur risk unless the conse-
quences of resource trade-offs are themselves assessed.
An example relevant to drinking water safety arose
from the actions of the Saskatchewan Department of
Environment and Resource Management (SERM) prior to
the North Battleford Cryptosporidoisis outbreak in April
2001. This provincial department held legislative responsi-
bility for the drinking water programme in Saskatchewan
and, when faced with budget cuts in the mid 1990s, it
drastically reduced the already limited field inspection
and enforcement of municipal drinking water facilities.
This culminated in a SERM proposal to eliminate its drink-
ing water programme altogether that was tentatively
approved by the Treasury Board in 2000/2001 and justified
as being based on risk-based decision-making. The sub-
sequent North Battleford outbreak, infecting between
5800 and 7100 persons in the immediate community plus
a large numbers of visitors from three other provinces,
led to a public inquiry into the outbreak and the provincial
drinking water regulatory system. Justice Laing concluded
in his Inquiry report:
that the current risk-based model employed by SERM since
1996 is arrived at on the basis of economics, and has nothing
to do with how best to safeguard the health of the population,
all of whom consume water. (Laing, 2002).
For a provincial regulator to use ‘risk’ as a basis for
eliminating altogether inspections and field support at a
time when a substantial number of utilities were out of
compliance with the drinking water guidelines appears to
be a serious distortion of the concept of risk as the basis
for decision-making.
Strategic Risk Analysis
Risks at the strategic level include project, commercial
and financial risks, such as those associated with infrastruc-
ture investment; merger and acquisition activity; company
reputation; outsourcing; and the long term viability of
investment decisions. Louis and Rogers (2001) provide a
strategic risk analysis of three investment strategies and
describe a multi-objective planning model that seeks to
optimize operational capacity and economic, environ-
mental and social gains. The project and investment risks
associated with public-private partnerships are reviewed
by Grimsey and Lewis (2002). Using the financing of
Stirling Water, a Scottish design–build–operate contractor
as an illustrative example, they discuss the complexity of
the contractual arrangements within such partnerships
and use a quantitative analysis of returns on investment
to characterize the robustness of cash flows from each of
the senior lenders to this public–private venture. Rothstein
and Kiyosaki (2003) describe the application of portfolio
management theory to utility investments in order to pro-
vide a balance of risk and return that is consistent with
the utility’s strategic goals and objectives. This approach,
facilitated by tools including multi-attribute analysis
and scenario planning, involves: (a) determining the set
of investments available to the water utility and their
characteristics in terms of risks (both monetary and non-
monetary), returns and resource requirements; (b) priori-
tizing investment opportunities across functional areas
(i.e. looking beyond departmental barriers within organisa-
tions); and (c) selecting investment options by virtue of
their alignment with established corporate goals and
objectives.
Group risk managers also need to consider risks external
to their operations. Water utilities are becoming increas-
ingly exposed to commercial and market risks (Rothstein
and Kiyosaki, 2003; Westerhoff and Lane, 1996), exposing
them to a climate of operational uncertainty, including cur-
rency and interest rate fluctuations, competitive dynamics
(the interactions between utilities in a liberalised market),
and stock market volatility. In this context, recognizing
the link between risk and opportunity becomes crucial.
Tools and techniques to evaluate these risks include value
at risk models, which examine gross or notional assets
at risk (e.g. currency exposure) from a change in a key
market variable (exchange rates); and scenario/simulation
modelling, which can offer insights into how aspects of
the market may evolve. As privatization and globalization
take root within the water utility sector, in concert with
an increasingly demanding regulatory and consumer
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environment (Westerhoff, 2003), the evaluation and man-
agement of these risks will become increasingly important.
IMPLEMENTING AND IMPROVING RISK
MANAGEMENT IN ORGANIZATIONS
Making credible and defensible decisions in organi-
zations requires an institutional capacity to be predictive
rather than reactive when managing risk and an aptitude
to learn from experience. Implementing risk analysis
strategies and decision-making frameworks requires clear,
straightforward procedures that can be understood, agreed
and operated by all levels in an organization. ‘Keeping it
as simple as it needs to be’ has been a mantra of risk ana-
lysts (Morgan and Henrion, 1990). The implementation of a
working framework should not be seen as the end-point of
risk management (DeLoach, 2000). Businesses must strive
to continuously re-assess and improve their capabilities for
dealing with risk. Senior management must be able to
define their risk management capabilities (both current
and desired) and assess the costs and benefits of improve-
ment (DeLoach, 2000). An increasingly applied tool that
can assist in achieving this goal is the capability maturity
model. Initially developed for the improvement of software
processes (Paulk et al., 1993), the model has been adapted
and applied for use more broadly (IACCM, 2003), for
example in the oil and gas sector (Sharp et al., 2002).
Risk mature organisations have the following key processes
in place (Strutt, 2003):
(1) Core risk management processes, including (i) setting
and allocation of safety risk and reliability require-
ments, (ii) performance of risk analyses including
reliability and safety studies to inform decisions, (iii)
design and operation of plant to meet specified risk
and reliability requirements, and (iv) risk assurance to
the customers, stakeholders and regulators.
(2) Typical organizational implementation processes
include (i) the verification of management processes
and validation of risk models and data, (ii) project
risk management (ensures risks managed to cost and
delivery schedules), (iii) emergency response manage-
ment, (iv) reliability, qualification and safety testing
(provides assurance of performance), (v) measurement
and analysis of data (assurance of what is achieved
in service), (vi) procedures for the management of
change (identifying key differences), and (vii) supply
chain management (sometimes failures and incidents
have their causes in products supplied down the
supply chain).
(3) Institutional support. Finally, there is an expectation
that the implementation of a risk management frame-
work will be supported by organizational learning,
education and training and research and development.
Capability maturity models have a set of well-defined
attributes that can be used to benchmark organizations
within a sector. A company’s capability in risk manage-
ment can be evaluated by reference to these attributes
and well-defined ‘scores’ representing a scale from poor
to best practice in the demonstration of that attribute.
‘Spider diagrams’ (Figure 6) allow comparisons between
organizations and cross-sector similarities to be established,
showing where further improvements can be made. Using
these models, it is possible to rank an organization’s
progression from a learner to exemplar of best practice in
risk management. Sharp et al. (2002) describe five levels
of maturity. At level 5 (highest), the organization is at
‘best practice’, capable of learning and adapting itself. It
not only uses experience to correct any problems, but
also to change the nature of the way it operates. Level 4
organizations are ‘managed organizations’ controlling
what they do in the way of processes with requirements,
ensuring these are met through feedback. A level 3 ‘defined
organization’ can say what it does and how it goes about it,
whilst level 2 can repeat what it has done before, but not
necessarily define what it does or adapt previous experience
to a new situation. Finally, a level 1 organization is charac-
terized by an absence of the above qualities. Of fundamen-
tal importance is the acceptance that resources are finite,
and so desired capabilities should be selectively pursued
according to particular risks or risk types (DeLoach,
2000). The value of these models of course is in identifying
what measures are required for an organization to progress
between levels of maturity in risk analysis and manage-
ment. Ultimately, of course, risk analysis as only as good
as the decision it informs and risk management activity
should reflect sensible and meaningful conclusions rather
than theoretical perspectives that may run counter to
sound judgements (Hrudey and Hrudey, 2003).
Figure 6. Illustrative spider diagram showing organisation profile (red) by reference to key aspects of safety and design (after Sharp et al., 2002).
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CONCLUSIONS
The water utility sector has made substantial progress to
recognizing the value of risk analysis strategies and
decision-making frameworks within its business, evidenced
by a number of current international water sector initia-
tives. Embedding these systems within organizations and
making them fit for purpose is the next step.
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